A brief light on India Pakistan and US relations

A brief light on India Pakistan and US relations

 “The U.S. feels that Pakistan is better poised than ever before to deal with its internal challenges, and emphasises the fact that this is the first democratic government that succeeded a democratic government, has brought the economy back on track and has stabilised governance.” Picture shows Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif before a bilateral meeting, in New Delhi in 2014

There have been many explanations as to why Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched a new round of talks with Pakistan, abandoning the several conditions that had stalled the bilateral engagement. But no account of the turnaround has adequately accounted for what has been happening between the U.S. and Pakistan over the last two months and how it may have influenced the Indian repositioning. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Pakistan army chief Raheel Sharif visited the U.S. in October and November respectively. A joint statement by President Barack Obama and PM Sharif, a background briefing provided to Indian journalists by a senior U.S. administration official and, most recently, a House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing of U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Olson on December 16, give one a sense of how the U.S. sees Pakistan, and the implications for India.

Redrawing the redlines

Until the recent turnaround, India followed the pre-election rhetoric of the current government leaders that India would unilaterally set the terms of engagement with Pakistan. On February 21, 2014, months before he became the National Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval said: “If you know the trick, we know the tricks better than you. If you do another Mumbai, you lose Balochistan.” He added that “defensive offence” would be the approach towards Pakistan, which entailed working on the vulnerabilities of Pakistan and isolating it internationally. While the media took note of Mr. Doval’s earlier positions when he became the NSA — in Pakistan with a sense of unease and in India with characteristic jingoism — there was no official attempt to undo it. On the contrary, fresh statements — by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar in the context of dealing with terrorism, that India would “remove a thorn with another thorn”; by Minister of State Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore that the Indian cross-border operation in Myanmar in June was a message to Pakistan; by Mr. Doval that India would “convince Pakistan in the language it understands” — only added to the mystery of India’s Pakistan policy. Incidentally, “talking to Pakistan in the language that it understands” was a favourite one-liner of Mr. Modi throughout the 2014 election campaign. A joke in Washington goes that a dossier that Pakistan PM Sharif gave to President Obama as “evidence” of India promoting terrorism in Pakistan was only a compilation of such speeches!

In restarting talks with Pakistan, India has abandoned the redlines that were drawn recently, mainly the position that Kashmir was not a bilateral issue and Pakistan could not engage the Kashmiri separatist leaders.

Pakistan as a key partner

The U.S.-Pakistan joint statement had referred to terrorism as a subject of mutual concern, lending credence to Pakistan’s position that India has been fomenting trouble in Balochistan.

The official who spoke to Indian reporters explained that since both countries were accusing each other of terrorism, the best way to resolve the issue was by talking to each other. Except this point about terrorism being a “mutual concern”, most other points of the background briefing were stated by Mr. Olson in the open hearing of the committee, forcefully defending the U.S. engagement with Pakistan, including the plan to sell more F-16 fighter jets to it. All members of the committee were vocal in questioning the administration’s approach, indicating a success of Indian diplomacy in reaching out to U.S. lawmakers. Many of them wanted specific assurance regarding the trial of the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack and action against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). “We continue to press Pakistan about the need not just to ban the LeT but take action against it, particularly against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks,” said Mr. Olson, but he went on to remind lawmakers that U.S. disengagement with Pakistan in the 1990s had blinded it to developments in the region that would culminate in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. “Our national interest is to not allow Pakistan to disengage from us.”

Mr. Olson’s argument was that in combating Islamist terrorism, Pakistan was a key partner. He was candid about the Obama administration’s view on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): “ISI has a role to play with regard to Afghan reconciliation. The role that Pakistan played in bringing the Taliban to the table last summer was quite important. They need to do that again and there were positive statements at the Heart of Asia conference.”

He also fielded questions on securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from terrorists and its nuclear programme in general. “We are concerned by the pace and scope of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, particularly its pursuit of short-range nuclear systems. We are concerned that a conventional conflict in South Asia could escalate to use of nuclear weapons.” About Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falling into dangerous hands, Mr. Olson said: “We have confidence in the capability of the Pakistan security forces to secure their nuclear weapons. There is a clean-up from the situation that existed a decade ago.”

Stable Pakistan, stable South Asia

The U.S. also feels that Pakistan is better poised than ever before to deal with its internal challenges, and emphasises the fact that this is the first democratic government that succeeded a democratic government, has brought the economy back on track and has stabilised governance. The U.S. is also convinced that Pakistan’s attitude towards terrorism has changed after the Peshawar terror episode that targeted schoolchildren and the only remaining question is their ability — and the requirement — to do more against LeT and the Haqqani network.

The U.S. is clear that it is invested in “stabilising Pakistan”, and Mr. Olson detailed at some length the numerous initiatives it has taken to promote education, health care and governance there. “A major thrust of our assistance programme is regional connectivity… The new thaw in India-Pak. relations could lead to more trade in the region,” he said, after terming External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Islamabad as a significant upturn in relations.

Now, regional connectivity is a promise that the Modi government had held out, as enunciated by Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar on July 20, 2015, at his IISS-Fullerton Lecture in Singapore. “To begin with, the approach to India’s neighbours has undergone a big shift, symbolised by the invitation extended to their leaders when the government was first sworn in. Since then, we have seen the themes of greater connectivity, stronger cooperation and broader contacts dominate India’s engagement with them.” But things soon went downhill, first with Pakistan as a result of the inexplicable new redlines, and then recently with Nepal, burying the ‘neighbourhood first’ outlook.

If India had continued its stand-off with Pakistan, it would have fallen foul of the U.S. strategy for South Asia, centring around stability in Afghanistan, securing the Pakistani nuclear arsenal from terrorists and stabilising Pakistan by integrating it with the regional economy. No explanation of India’s turnaround on Pakistan would be complete without accounting for this.